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Abstract 
 
In order to shed light on the intergenerational consequences of immigration legislation, this 
paper investigates the impact of the largest amnesty program in the U.S. history (IRCA) on 
scholastic achievement of immigrants’ children.  Using IRCA as a source of exogenous legal 
status, empirical estimates indicate that immigrants’ legal status improves their children’s math 
scores by 0.70 of a standard deviation and the reading scores by 0.50 of a standard deviation.  
The above results account for misreporting in legal status among illegal immigrants by using a 
two-step semi-parametric method to purge the misreporting bias from conventional IV estimates. 
 
JEL Classifications: J18, O15, R23 
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1.  Introduction 
 
During the past three decades, the population of unauthorized immigrants in the U.S. has 
been growing rapidly.  Unauthorized immigrants are estimated to account for one third of the 
foreign-born population in the U.S. (Passel 2006).    And they also produce a large number of the 
next generation of Americans.  It is estimated that about five million children (6% of U.S. 
children) have one parent or both parents as illegal immigrants (Passel 2006).  Two-thirds of 
these children are U.S. citizens by birth.    And most of these children will likely live in the U.S. 
for their entire lives.    This paper studies how scholastic development of immigrants’ children is 
affected by their parents’ legal status.  In other words, if the illegal immigrants were to be 
legalized, could this act benefit their children’s development?     
There are several mechanisms through which immigrants’ legal status could affect their 
children’s scholastic achievements.  Literature in education finds that children’s scholastic 
performance is a function of parental income (Korenman et al. 1994, Duncan et al. 1998, and Dahl 
and Lochner 2005), type of neighborhood (Rosenbaum 1995; Ludwig et al. 2001), and parental 
involvement in school (Herman and Yeh 1983; Marschall 2006).  All of these factors can be 
influenced by immigrant’s legal status.  For example, Rivera-Batiz (1999) and Kossoudji and 
Cobb-Clark (2002) finds that legal status has an impact on immigrants’ earnings.    And later part 
of this paper provides evidence that legal status influences immigrant households’ parental school 
involvement and likelihood of living in ethnic enclaves.  Therefore, the above parental factors 
can be the channels through which the intergenerational impact of legal status takes place.     
In order to estimate the causal impact of immigrants’ legal status on children’s scholastic 
outcome, the endogeneity of legal status should be accounted for.  Higher ability (more   2
intelligent or more self-motivated) people are more likely to be legal, as opposed to illegal 
immigrants.    If ability is transmittable to children from parents, and if high ability parents know 
better how to educate their children, then legal status would just be a proxy for the inheritable 
ability.  Consequently, the effect of legal status itself will be overestimated.  The limited 
literature
1 on intergenerational impact of immigration status does not provide a solution to this 
endogeneity issue.     
The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), the largest amnesty program in U.S. 
history, provides a good natural experiment in immigrants’ legal status.    This paper exploits this 
law to construct an instrument for the endogenous legal status.  The IRCA was unexpectedly 
passed in 1986 and allowed all immigrants who entered the U.S. before 1982 to be legalized 
(Briggs 2004; Orrenius and Zavodry 2003).  The consequence of this amnesty is that the 
probability of having legal status for pre-1982 arrivals is almost one; in contrast, the probability 
for post-1982 arrivals immediately drops.    This discontinuous drop in 1982 cannot be explained 
by the effect of immigrants’ duration of stay in the U.S.    On the other hand, no evidence shows 
that the immigrants who entered a few years before 1982 are different in individual ability from 
the immigrants who entered a few years after 1982.    Therefore, the indicator that an immigrant 
entered before or after 1982 is an eligible instrument for her legal status.       
The data this paper uses are from the Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey 
(LAFANS).  This dataset provides records of immigrants’ entry year and self-reported 
immigration status, which enable me to use the above instrument strategy.  However, the 
self-reported immigration status brings another empirical obstacle: misreporting bias.  It is not 
                                                        
1  Kanaiaupini (2000) finds that in a small sample of immigrant families in Houston and San Diego, children of illegal 
immigrants faced more health risks than children of legal immigrants.    Another related paper is Dustmann (2007), which 
employs a German survey and finds that immigrant fathers’ return migration probability is negatively correlated with the 
probability of their children attending high school.   3
surprising that illegal immigrants tend to misreport their true status in surveys to avoid penalty 
and deportation.
2  When a binary variable, such as legal status, is measured with error, neither 
the OLS nor the IV estimate is consistent (Kane, et al. 1999).  The OLS estimate is biased 
toward zero while the IV estimate is biased away from zero.    Following the procedure proposed 
by Brachet (2005), which is heavily based on the model in Hausman et al. (1998), I use a two-step 
semi-parametric method to estimate the misreporting rate, and to recover the effect of true legal 
status on children’s scholastic performance. 
The main results of this paper can be summarized as follows: First, had the illegal Latino 
immigrant women who arrived in the US during 1982-1986 migrated before 1982 and thus been 
granted legal status by IRCA, their children’s math scores could have raised by 0.65 of a standard 
deviation and reading scores by 0.50 of a standard deviation.    Second, the above estimates have 
taken misreporting into account.  The empirical result indicates that about 46% of truly illegal 
Latina immigrant women misreport their status.  If the misreporting is ignored, the estimated 
impact of immigrants’ legal status on their children’s scholastic achievement using regular IV 
method could be twice as high as the results reported above.    Third, parental income, residential 
location choice and parental involvement are found to be the main channels though which parental 
legal status influences children’s scholastic performance.         
The remainder of this paper is organized in six sections: Section 2 reviews the literature to 
provide a theoretical framework.  Section 3 introduces the LAFANS data and the legislative 
background of the amnesty program IRCA (1986), and discusses the instrument in use.    Section 
4 introduces the empirical model to address the concern of the coexistence of omitted variables 
bias and the misclassification bias.    Section 5 presents the empirical results.    Section 6 analyzes 
                                                        
2  Warren and Passel (1997) scrutinize census data and find that misreporting in citizenship widely exists among foreign-born 
people.   4
the four possible mechanisms through which the intergenerational impact of parental immigration 
status takes place, Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
 
Haveman and Wolfe (1995) review the economic theories of the determinants of children’s 
educational outcome.    A child’s educational outcome is influenced by her parents in two ways.   
One is by inheriting her parents’ endowments, including biological attributes (such as intelligence) 
and cultural attributes (such as commitment to learning). (Becker and Tomes, 1985)    The second 
way parental influence works is from a variety of choices that parents make for the family.  
Given their preference and economic resources, parents make many decisions including 
consumption, investment in children’s education and health, as well as residential location, 
fertility and family structure.    A child’s educational outcome, as one of the outputs of her family, 
is influenced by many of the parents’ choices.   
In this framework, legal status influences children’s educational outcome by the second way 
stated above.  The illegal status of unauthorized immigrants puts them at a disadvantage in 
bargaining for wages, limits their choice set of occupation and residential location and adds 
uncertainty to their life.    Exogenous change in legal status, such as the one generated by IRCA 
(1986), removes many constraints in immigrants’ economic and social activities, and improves 
immigrant families’ economic resources and choice sets, through which children’s educational 
outcome can be benefited.     
First, illegal status imposes wage penalties, which restricts illegal immigrants’ resources that 
can be invested in their children’s education.  Rivera-Batiz (1999) and Kossoudji and   5
Cobb-Clark (2002) both use Legalized Population Surveys (LPS) and finds the average wage of 
Mexican illegal immigrants grew by 15-20% after they were legalized under IRCA.    About half 
of the growth cannot be explained by changes in observed characteristics, such as age, marital 
status and education attainment.  Rivera-Batiz concludes that the unexplained part reflects 
discrimination against illegal status.    Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark (2002) attribute the unexplained 
part to increased return to immigrants’ skills, because legalization grants immigrants freedom to 
find jobs that better match their skills.  In either case, legalization substantially increases the 
earnings of illegal immigrants.  And this can have a positive impact on children’s educational 
outcome, if the demand for investment in children’s education is income elastic.
3   
Second, illegal status of unauthorized immigrants can also negatively affect their children’s 
scholastic achievement by having the families be more likely to live in ethnic enclaves.    Though 
there is no literature studying the relationship between legal status and the type of neighborhoods 
in which immigrants choose to live, it is reasonable to suppose that illegal immigrants are more 
prone to live in enclaves than legal immigrants due to the concern for security and survival.    For 
illegal immigrants, a community with a large number of the same ethnic population is the best 
place to hide themselves from the attention of immigration law enforcement.  In addition, the 
ethnic networks in enclaves help illegal immigrants in job-searching.  Edin et al. (2003) use a 
natural experiment provided by the immigrant policy of Sweden and find that living in ethnic 
enclaves has a positive effect on the earnings of the first generation of low-skilled immigrants.  
However, such benefits may not pass to the second generation.    Enclave residence gives children 
of immigrants little exposure to English and could result in limited English proficiency (Chiswick 
                                                        
3  For example, Dahl and Lochner (2005) estimate that a $1,000 increase in family income, which is exogenously caused by a 
welfare program, raises Black or Hispanic children’s math scores by 0.03 of a standard deviation and reading scores by 0.05 of 
a standard deviation.   6
and Miller 1995).  A large number of studies in the fields of education, psychology, and 
linguistic study find that language proficiency affects students’ acquisition of knowledge, 
participation in class activities, and self-expectation for learning.   
In addition to the above mechanisms, there are other potential reasons why immigrants’ legal 
status affects their children’s scholastic achievement.    For example, illegal immigrants probably 
don’t want to be exposed to the public and they usually don’t speak English well.    Hence, they 
tend to be distant from teachers and counselors at schools and not to be involved in their 
children’s school life.    Lack of parent-school attachment could easily lead to students’ absence 
from schools (Hanna 2003) and poor scholastic performance.  The intergenerational effect of 
immigrant parents’ legal status that this paper intends to estimate is the treatment effect that could 
work through all kinds of mechanisms. 
.  
3.  The Data and IRCA 
 
3.1 The LAFANS Data   
This study uses the Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey (LAFANS) data.  
During the period of April 2000 and January 2002, 1,981 households with children from 65 
census tracts of Los Angeles County completed the survey.  In each household, one randomly 
selected child and the child’s mother, who was designated the Primary Care Giver.  In 
multi-child households, one of the siblings of the randomly selected child was also selected at 
random as a second child respondent.    Because the survey did not particularly interview fathers, 
the immigration status of father is missing (See Appendix A for detailed discussion on this issue). 
     7
3.1.1 Definition of Immigrants’ Legal Status   
Figure I illustrates how immigrants’ legal status was determined in the LAFANS 
questionnaire.    The survey asked the foreign-born people a series of questions regarding to their 
citizenship, permanent residency (“green card”), refugee type, and visa status.  One who 
reported to have the U.S. citizenship, or the permanent residency, or a refugee status, or a valid 
visa is classified as “legal immigrants.”  The others were classified as “illegal immigrants.”
4  
Using the definition of legal status described above, I am able to identify the immigration status 
of 1,871 mothers.    754 (40%) of them are native born; another 757 (40%) are legal immigrants; 
and the remaining 360 (20%) are illegal immigrants.  Due to the fact that Latina immigrants 
account for 72% of legal immigrants and 99% of illegal immigrants in the survey, this study 
focuses on Latino immigrant families.     
 
3.1.2 Measurement of Children’s Scholastic Achievement 
Three tests from the Woodcock Johnson-Revised Test of Achievement (WJ-R) were 
administered to the randomly selected children and siblings.  Applied Problems assessment 
which is a math test, and Letter-Word Identification test, which is a vocabulary test, are 
administered to children ages 3-17.    Passage Comprehension assessment, which is a reading test, 
is administered to children ages 6-17.    Compared to vocabulary test, reading test assesses more 
advanced reading abilities.  Tests could be completed in English or Spanish depending on the 
respondent’s preference.  All the raw scores are standardized to normative scores that show a 
LAFANS child's reading and math abilities in comparison to the national average for the child's 
                                                        
4  This method of classifying legal status is well-accepted in the literature of illegal  immigrants.  For  example,  the  same 
classification was adopted by Goldman et al. (2005) and Prentice et al. (2005).   8
age.
5  Standard scores have a population mean of 100 and a standard deviation of 15.  I 
re-normalize the standard scores by subtracting 100 from the scores and dividing by 15.  The 
detailed interpretation of the scores is presented by Table A.1.   
The upper part of Table I presents the average test scores of children by their mothers’ legal 
status.
6  Rows (1)-(3) indicate that legal immigrants’ children on average perform better in all 
three tests than their illegal counterparts.  The differences for math and reading tests are 
significant at 90% confidence level, while the difference for vocabulary test is insignificant.  
Row (4) indicates that legal immigrants’ children are more likely than illegal immigrants’ 
children to take tests in English.  The difference is significant at 99% confidence level.  
However, whether the gap between the two types of children is caused by their mother’s 
immigration status remains a question because legal status is not random.     
The lower part of Table I compares the characteristics of Latino immigrant women by their 
immigration status.  Illegal immigrant women are different from their legal counterparts in 
almost every aspect.    One of the most striking differences is that about one in four legal Latina 
immigrant women migrates as a child (before age 14) while almost all illegal immigrant women 
migrate as adults (at age 14 or older).  Immigrants arriving before age 14 are defined in 
immigration literature as the 1.5 generation  The 1.5 generation has the benefit of exposure to 
U.S. norms, education, and language during their formative childhood years, and they are found to 
have a markedly different schooling and earnings trajectory than the first generation, who arrived 
as adults (Fry 2002).    Hence, mixing children of those who themselves grow up in the U.S. and 
children of those who arrived as adults makes it complicated to disentangle the generation effect 
                                                        
5  The scores of Spanish form users are normalized in the way that their scores are comparable to the scores of English form 
users.   
6  The negative mean of math and reading scores indicate that the sampled children perform worse than national mean.   9
from parental legal status effect.  For this reason, the 1.5 generation immigrants and their 
children are excluded in the following analysis.
7    However, the ideal thing for identification is a 
natural experiment in immigrants’ legal status. 
 
3.2 The Legislative Background of IRCA 1986 
After years of debate on how to best curb illegal immigration, Congress passed the bill 
known as the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) in October 1986.    It was signed into 
law by President Ronald Reagan on November 6, 1986.    The bill contained three key provisions.   
It mandated the intensification of Border Patrol activities; criminalized the act of knowingly 
hiring an illegal immigrant as well as established sanctions for such employers; and enacted two 
amnesty programs to address the concern of shortage in seasonal agricultural workers and to 
“wipe the slate clean”.   
Two amnesty programs offered legal status to two types of undocumented aliens: 
1)  Those who have continuously resided in the United States since January 1, 1982.    This 
is the Legally Authorized Workers (LAW) program or so called pre-1982 program.     
2)  Those who have worked in agriculture for 90 days or more between May 1985 and May 
1986.    This is the Special Agricultural Workers (SAW) program.     
About 1.7 million LAW applications and 1.3 million SAW applications were filed.    Over 90 
percent of the applications were approved, meaning over 2.7 million immigrants were granted 
amnesty under the two programs.     
Though two amnesty programs were available, the only relevant program to LAFANS 
immigrant women was the pre-1982 program.  The first reason is that agricultural workers are 
                                                        
7  In fact, after the 1.5 generation is dropped, many differences between legal and illegal Latina immigrant women presented in 
Table I become smaller.    Some of them even disappear.     10
mostly male.  Chiswick (1988) documents that 83 percent of the SAW program were male as 
opposed to approximately half men and half women in the LAW applicants.    The second reason 
is that Los Angeles County is an urban area.  Only about 1% LAFANS interviewees work in 
agricultural industry.  Figure II displays the ratio of legal Latina immigrant women to total 
Latina immigrant women by entry year.  It is obvious among the plots that a discontinuity 
happens at the entry year of 1982.    For each pre-1982 cohort, the fraction of legal immigrant is 
either one or very close to one, suggesting that pre-1982 immigrants benefited from LAW.  In 
contrast, starting from the cohort of 1982, the fraction of legal immigrant drops.  The highest 
fraction of legal immigrants among the post-1982 cohorts is 0.86 (1986 cohort), still much less 
than most of the pre-1982 cohorts.   
The regressions in Table II further show that entering before 1982 is a good predictor of 
immigrant women’s legal status, the sample in use is the 192 Latina immigrant women who 
arrived in the U.S. during 1977-86
8 at the age of at least 14.  The dependent variable is the 
binary indicator of self-reported legal status.  Both the Linear Probability Model (LPM) and 
Probit regressions are used.    Columns (1) and (3) only use the entry year dummies as regressors, 
while columns (2) and (4) include several characteristics of these women as controls.  The 
default cohort is the 1982 cohort.  Two conclusions can be drawn from this table:  First, the 
cut-off year is 1982, but not any other random year.  Columns (1)-(4) all indicate that the 
likelihood of being legal for each pre-1982 cohort is significantly higher than that of the default 
cohort, while the likelihood of being legal for each post-1982 cohort is not significantly different 
from that of the default cohort.  Second, since the immigrant women’s duration in the U.S. is 
included in columns (2) and (4), the higher likelihoods of being legal for the pre-1982 cohorts 
                                                        
8  The reason to restrict sample to these particular 10 years will be illustrated later in the section.     11
cannot be interpreted as a duration effect, but has to be understood as the effect of the amnesty.     
Discontinuity at 1982 cohort also happens to children’s test scores.  Figures IIIa and IIIb 
display the average test scores of children
9 by their mothers’ entry year.  Within the 10-year 
window between 1977 and 1986, a striking decrease in average scores exists in 1982 in both 
figures, which indicates that children of pre-1982 immigrants have an advantage over children of 
later immigrants.  Figure IIIc also shows an obvious discontinuous gap between children of 
pre-1982 immigrants and children of post-1982 (except 1983) immigrants in terms of taking test 
in English.    The above analysis suggests that entering before or after 1982 can be a candidate of 
the instrument to immigrants’ legal status. 
 
3.3 The Validity of the Instrument   
Exclusion restriction requires that a valid instrument has to be uncorrelated with any 
unobservable that could have an impact on the outcome.  In this section, I examine this 
restriction, i.e. whether pre-1982 arrivals and post-1982 arrivals could be different types of 
immigrants.  Since IRCA happened in 1986, two groups of post-1982 immigrants need to be 
separately compared with pre-1982 immigrants.  One is 1982-1986 arrivals; the other is 
post-IRCA arrivals.    I first examine post-IRCA arrivals and then examine 1982-1986 arrivals.   
 
3.3.1 Pre-IRCA Immigrants Vs. Post-IRCA Immigrants 
One of the unintended consequences of IRCA is that it did not deter new illegal immigrants 
from entering the U.S. but continued to draw them in (Orrenius and Zavodny 2003).    Figure IV 
displays the number of Latina immigrant women in LAFANS data by their entry year.  The 
                                                        
9  Children are not older than 17 in 2000.    Considering that their parents entered U.S. during 1977-1986, over 90 percent of the 
sampled children are US-born.   12
number of observations surges during 1988-1990.  Latino illegal immigrants heavily rely on 
established immigrants in the U.S. to assist their migration.  The immigrants legalized under 
IRCA lower the cost of their relatives’ and friends’ to attempt new migrations, and thus may 
induce those who had not previously sought migration to migrate.    In 1988, the U.S. consulate in 
Tijuana experienced 48% increase in applicants for temporary visas (Cornelius 1989).    Moreover, 
the desire for family reunion may have also changed the extent to which people value migration.   
Cornelius (1989) also documents that the Mexico consulates in the U.S. border cities reported a 
sharp increase in the number of undocumented children being detained by the Border Patrol in 
1988.  The above two reasons for the surge in the number of immigrants following IRCA 
suggests that post-IRCA immigrants may have different characteristics from pre-IRCA 
immigrants.    In the LAFANS sample, post-IRCA Latina immigrant women on average were 2.2 
years older at arrival and had one more year of schooling than their pre-IRCA counterparts.  
Both differences are statistically significant.  Due to the concern that the pre/post-IRCA 
immigrants may have different unobservable endowments that would affect their children, 
post-1986 immigrants and their children are excluded from the empirical analysis of this paper. 
 
3.3.2 Pre-1982 Immigrants Vs. 1982-1986 Immigrants 
The next question is whether 1982-86 immigrants are homogenous as pre-1982 immigrants.     
First, I want to address a concern as to why 1982 was picked by the legislators as the cut-off year.   
The legislators’ intention was to legalize those who had set up permanent households in the U.S.   
The belief was that those who had lived at least five years under illegal status could be very 
determined to stay in the U.S..    When the first version of IRCA was proposed, but failed to pass, 
in 1982, it included an amnesty program that would legalize pre-1978 immigrants (Ramirez 1983).     13
When IRCA was eventually passed in 1986, the cut-off year became 1982.
10  Therefore, 1982 
was picked only because of the five-year duration rule, not because that the legislators thought 
pre-1982 immigrants had possessed better attributes than their post-1982 counterparts. 
In each year between 1982 and 1986 (inclusive), an immigration reform bill including an 
amnesty program was passed by one house of Congress but failed to pass in the other.    Years of 
debate over this issue might have led people in foreign countries somehow to believe that there 
would be an amnesty program ahead and thus decided to migrate even without documents.  If 
such anticipation existed and particularly attracted low-ability people to migrate, 1982-86 arrivals 
could on average have lower abilities than pre-1982 arrivals.  Orrenius and Zavodry (2003) 
examine the monthly border apprehensions during 1977-89 and find no association between 
border apprehensions and the year dummy variable which indicates at least one house of Congress 
passed an immigration reform bill.  Therefore, there is no evidence to suggest that immigrants 
who crossed the border without documents during 1982-86 did so because they were more certain 
than their pre-1982 counterparts that an amnesty program was soon to be enacted.     
Actually by the time that IRCA was passed, neither immigrants nor legislators themselves 
believe that the passage could actually happen.  Briggs (2004) documented “… after failing to 
pass Congress in both 1982 and 1984, it appeared that the legislation would die in 1986 for this 
very reason.” Orrenius and Zavodny (2003) also documented "On September 26, 1986, the House 
voted not to take up the immigration reform bill but then, in a ‘stunning reversal’, passed the 
amnesty on October 9.” 
In order to further provide evidence that the pre-IRCA immigrants are homogenous, Figure V 
displays Latino immigrant women’s years of schoolings and age at arrival by entry year.    Both 
                                                        
10  Even recent new amnesty proposals, e.g. the Hagel-Martinez bill in 2006, continue to use the arbitrary five-year-old 
“root” criteria.   14
figures are smooth at 1981 to 1982.  Table III compares a variety of characteristics of the 
1977
11-1981 arrivals and the 1982-1986 arrivals.    Not surprisingly, the earlier cohorts are older 
and have stayed in the U.S. longer.    Except for age and duration, the 1982-1986 arrivals show no 
difference in all other observed characteristics from the pre-1982 arrivals. 
       
3.3.3 Selection of Migration and Return Migration   
Figure IV shows that the number of immigrants fluctuates significantly by year of entry, and 
there is a large decline between 1980-1981 arrivals and 1982-1983 arrivals.    Since the majority 
of immigrants come to the U.S. seeking jobs to increase personal and family’s wealth, the 
macroeconomic conditions in the U.S. can affect aliens’ intension of migration.    In Figure VI, I 
plot the Californian unemployment rate together with the number of LAFANS immigrant women 
by entry year.
12  The clear negative correlation between the two variables indicates that 
immigrants responded very well to business cycle of the host country.    When the U.S. economy 
was booming (or in recession), more (or less) people would migrate in.  In 1981, the U.S. 
economy started a recession, which lasted through 1983.    And the worst year was 1982 and 1983.   
This could explain why the number of immigrants sharply declines in 1982.     
The coincidence that IRCA and the recession happened in the same year brings a concern 
that the people who self-selected to be immigrants under different economic situation could have 
different unobservables.  Note that immigrants who moved to the U.S. during a recession and 
managed to survive and stay in the country potentially have higher unobservable abilities than 
immigrants who entered during a booming period.  Consequently, if there is a selection-bias 
                                                        
11  The starting year is set at 1977 in order to balance the number of years before and after the cut-off year 1982. 
12  I also plot the U.S. unemployment rate together with the number of Hispanic immigrant women in Census 2000 by entry 
year.    The figure has the same pattern as Figure VI.   15
caused by the U.S. economic fluctuation and selection of migration, the direction of the bias 
probably works against finding that pre-1982 immigrant families outperform post-1982 ones. 
Moreover, notice that the immigrants this paper studies stayed in the U.S. from 1980s to 
2000.  The  immigrants  who  decide  to  permanently  stay in the U.S. are only a proportion of the 
initial immigrants.  Many others may have returned to their original country during the two 
decades.  Another source of bias may arise from selection of return migration.  In fact, the 
five-year-residence rule of IRCA can help relieve the concern.  Lindstrom (1996) analyzes the 
data of Mexican Migrant Project and find that the duration of the first-trip of return migrants on 
average is 22 months and the standard deviation is 28 months.  His finding suggests that the 
pre-1982 immigrants who planned to return probably had already done so before IRCA.    Thanks 
to the design of IRCA, both pre-1982 and post-1982 arrivals who exist in a 2000 survey are those 
who intend to permanently stay in the U.S..           
 
3.3.4 Fraud of IRCA Applicants 
The large decline in the number of immigrants from 1981 to 1982 can bring another concern 
as follows.  Some 1982 and 1983 arrivals perhaps used fraudulent documents indicating 
continuous residence since January 1982 and thus obtained legal status.    These people could still 
lie about their year of entry in the LAFANS survey.    If this is true, and if the ability of lying is 
correlated with parenting skills, which itself is hard to believe, the instrument strategy can be 
jeopardized.  However,  literature  studying  IRCA  finds that it is the agricultural worker program 
(SAW), not the pre-1982 program (LAW), was the victim of fraud.    The criteria of SAW, which 
requires only 90 days of farm work experience, are much lower than that of LAW, which requires 
five years of continuous residence in the U.S..  “Those who qualified for neither were quickly   16
attracted to the SAW program.  Everyone in or near the legalization program recognized this 
situation.”(North 2005)    Before IRCA was practiced, the estimated SAW applicants were only a 
few hundred thousand.    However, the actual applicants were 1.3 million.    In contrast, the LAW 
applicants were estimated to be four million, but actually ended up with 1.7 million (Chiswick 
1988).    These numbers provide evidence that the SAW, rather than the LAW, was the target of 
fraudulent applications.  In other words, immigrants who intended to cheat to get legalization 
would cheat about their occupations rather than the years of entry.     
 
4.    The Model of Estimation 
 
4.1 The Empirical Model   
The empirical specification can be derived from Becker and Tomes’ (1986) model on 
intergenerational transmission of earnings and incorporates immigrant parents’ legal status.    The 
production function of a child’s scholastic achievement can be represented by:   
( 1 )            ) , ), ( (
*
ij i i i ij w H T y y Ω = .   
The subscript  i represents an immigrant parent and  j  represents her child.   ij y  represents 
the child’s scholastic achievement.   i Ω  represents a set of parental optimal choices, which is 
conditional on parental legal status, denoted by 
*
i T .  
*
i T   is a binary indicator, which is one if a 
parent is a legal immigrant and zero if she is illegal.  The elements of  i Ω  include parental 
earnings, residential location, residential mobility and parental school involvement.   i H  
represents a set of parental characteristics and parental optimal choices, which is presumably 
independent of parental legal status, e.g., family size and family structure.   ij w  represents a 
child’s endowment, e.g., intelligence and commitment to learning.  A child’s endowment is   17
transmitted from her parents’ endowment  i w  both through biological mechanisms and social 
mechanisms  (e.g.,  role  model).   
In the case that  ij w  is observable to economists, the total effect of legal status can be 
obtained by estimating the linear regression: 
( 2 )           ij ij j j ij u w H T y + + + + = 2 1
*
0 α α β α . 
However, economists usually are not able to observe all elements of  ij w .  Since 
*
i T   is 
correlated with unobserved  ij w  through  i w , the OLS estimate of  β  in fact captures both the 
effect of legal status and the effect of inherited endowment.    The identification of  β  relies  on 
some immigration policies that affect legal status of immigrants but meanwhile are orthogonal to 
immigrants’ endowments.  Section 3 indicates that IRCA provides a great candidate of instrument 
variable  z , defined as followed: 
         
⎩
⎨
⎧
=
immigrant   1982 - post   a   is mother     the if     0
immigrant   1982 - pre   a   is mother     the if     1
z . 
Therefore, the IV estimation model can be written as: 
( 3 a )           ij ij i i ij X H T y ε α α β α + + + + = 2 1
*
0 ;    
( 3 b )           ) 0 ( 1 2 1 0
* > + + + + = ij ij i i i v X H z T θ θ λ θ ,  
where  ij X   represents observed characteristics of a child, such as age and gender.   ij ε  and  ij v  
include the unobserved endowments and other shocks (e.g. luck).   The omitted variables problem is 
captured by the positive correlation between  ij ε  and  ij v .  However, equations (3a) and (3b) 
cannot be used as the ultimate empirical model, because 
*
i T   is likely to subject to non-trivial 
measurement error due to immigrants’ misreporting.   
 
4.2 Misclassification Bias   18
It can be risky for illegal immigrants to tell the truth about their migration status and many 
illegal immigrants lie in surveys.  Warren and Passel (1987) analyze the discrepancy between 
Census 1980 and INS alien registration figures.  They discover that a serious misreporting 
problem exists in self-reported citizenship in census data.    The misreporting rate was the highest 
for aliens from Mexico, the largest sending country of illegal immigrants.  About 65% 
self-reported Mexican naturalized citizens misreported their status.  Since the data used by this 
paper is from a survey conducted in Los Angeles County, a place with a large population of Latin 
American immigrants, the misreporting of legal status by interviewees is likely to be extensive.     
When a binary variable is measured with error, it is defined as a misclassification problem.   
Like classical measurement error, misclassification error causes attenuate bias to the OLS 
estimate (Aigner 1973, Hausman, Abrevaya and Morton 1998, Battistin and Sianesi 2006, and 
Lewbel  2007).  However,  unlike  classical  measurement error, misclassification error also biases 
IV estimate (Kane et al. 1999; Brachet 2005).  The bias arises from the specialty of 
misclassification error.  Unlike classical measurement error, the misreporting error term  e  is 
negatively correlated with the true treatment status indicator 
* T .  The reason is as follows.  
Define  T  as the self-reported status.  When  1
* = T , one can never over-report her treatment 
status, but can only under-report  0 ( = T  and  ) 1 − = e .    Likewise, those who are truly untreated 
) 0 (
* = T   can only over-report but never under-report themselves  1 ( = T  and  ) 1 = e .  Since 
* T  
is negatively correlated with  e , any instrument  z , which is (positively) correlated with 
* T , will 
generally be (negatively) correlated with e  (Kane et al. 1999).  Therefore, the exclusion 
restriction of instrument is violated, IV estimate is inconsistent.  Specifically, in the first-stage 
the estimate of the coefficient of  z   is biased toward zero and in the second-stage the estimate of 
treatment effect is biased away from zero.       19
 
4.2.1 The Misreporting Rates   
Under certain assumptions, misclassification bias can be purged.    Define the following two 
misreporting probabilities: 
( 5 )           ) 1 | 0 Pr(   and   ) 0 | 1 Pr(
*
1
*
0 = = = = = = i i i i T T m T T m . 
Specifically, under the scenario of misreporting in immigration status,  0 m  and  1 m , respectively, 
represent the probability that a truly illegal / legal immigrant misreports herself as a legal / illegal 
immigrant.  One  would  expect  that  1 m   is zero, because it does not make sense for a truly legal 
immigrant to misrepresent herself as an illegal immigrant.  The misreporting probabilities are 
assumed to be constant numbers that only depend on the true treatment status but are independent 
of any other observable or unobservable factors that would affect the outcome.
13  As  an  analog  to 
the classical measurement error assumption for the continuous variable, this assumption is 
equivalent to saying that conditional on 
* T , the misclassification error 
* T T −  does  not  provide 
any information about the expected outcome  y .    This assumption can be violated if, under the 
scenario of this paper, the illegal immigrants who misrepresent themselves as legal immigrants are 
smarter or know better in educating children than those illegal immigrants who do not misreport.   
Simple algebra shows that (See Brachet [2005] for detailed proof): 
( 6 )          ) | ( ) 1 ( ) | (
*
1 0 0 i i i i z T E m m m z T E ⋅ − − + = .   
Since the true treatment effect  β   is estimated by: 
( 7 )           ) | ( ) | (
*
0 i i i ij z T E z y E ⋅ + = β α , 
substitute equation (6) into (7) to obtain,   
                                                        
13  The constant misreporting probabilities assumption can be relaxed.    Lewbel (2007), and Battistin and Sianesi (2006) 
provide different versions of the model in which misreporting is allowed to depend on covariates.  However,  this  flexibility,  in 
practice, adds many difficulties to estimation.    The empirical part of this paper will provide evidences that it is reasonable to 
assume in this analysis that the misreporting rates are constant numbers.   20
(8)       ) | ( )
1
1
( )
1
( ) | (
1 0 1 0
0
0 i i i ij z T E
m m m m
m
z y E ⋅
− −
⋅ +
− −
⋅ − = β β α . 
The IV estimation ignores misclassification, replacing  ) | 1 (
*
i i z T E =  by  ) | 1 ( i i z T E = . Therefore, 
( 9 )            )
1
1
( ˆ lim
1 0 m m
p IV − −
⋅ = β β .   
Given that normally  1 0 1 0 < + < m m , the conventional IV estimate is biased away from zero.     
 
4.2.2 A Two-step Semi-Parametric Method 
In the case that the misreporting rates  0 m  and  1 m   are constant, they can be estimated as 
well as the other parameters by the following two-step semi-parametric method:     
(a) The first step is based on Hausman, Abrevaya and Scott-Morton (1998). 
Bring back the covariates  ij X  and  i H , and rewrite equation (6) as: 
(10)      
) ( ) 1 (                                       
) , , | 1 Pr( ) 1 ( ) , , | 1 Pr(
2 1 0 1 0 0
*
1 0 0
θ θ λ θ ij i i v
ij i i i ij i i i
X H z F m m m
X H z T m m m X H z T
+ + + ⋅ − − + =
= ⋅ − − + = =
 . 
) ( 2 1 θ θ λ θ ij i i o v X H z F + + +  is the distribution of  ij v , which is the error term of the first-stage 
equation (3b).  If  v F  is known, the set of parameters  )              ( 2 1 0 1 0 θ θ λ θ m m  can be jointly 
estimated by MLE, where the log-likelihood function is given by: 
(11)  
))]. ( ) 1 ( 1 ln( ) 1 ( )) ( ) 1 ( ln( [ )              ( 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 1 0 1 0 • • − − − − − + − − + =∑ v i v
ij
i F m m m T F m m m T m m L θ θ λ θ
After obtaining )   ˆ   ˆ    ˆ   ˆ   ˆ   ˆ ( 2 1 0 1 0 θ θ λ θ m m , the fitted probabilities that parent i is truly treated is 
computed as  ) ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( 2 1 θ θ λ θ ij j j o v X H z F + + + .  Note that if  v F  is known to be a logistic or 
normal distribution, equation (11) can be regarded as a transformed Logit or Probit model.
14   
(b) The second step is based on Brachet (2005): 
                                                        
14  If there is no misclassification problem, meaning  0 1 0 = = m m , then equation (13) collapses to the regular Logit or Probit 
model, and this two-step procedure is nothing but the conventional IV estimation.   21
Estimate the equation  ij ij j j ij X H T y ε α α β α + + + + =
∗
2 1 0  by OLS, substituting 
*
j T  by 
) ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( 2 1 θ θ λ θ ij j j o v X H z F + + + .  The resulting estimate of β  is consistent if the assumption of 
the specification of  v F  is correct.  The standard errors of the coefficients are derived by 
viewing this sequential estimation as a method of moments, as detailed by Newey (1984) and 
Murphy and Topel (1985). 
The equation (10) implies that identification of the parameters entirely comes from 
nonlinearity of the  v F  (Hausman  et  al.  1998).  In  particular, the identification of  0 m  and  1 m  
requires richness at the two ends of  v F   (Brachet 2005), or in other words, for some individuals, 
) , , | 1 Pr(
*
j ij j j H X z T =  is extremely close to 0 or 1.  This can be seen by taking the limits of 
equation (6): 
(12)       0 0 ) , , | 1 Pr( lim m H X z T j ij j j F = =
→ ν
 and  1 1 1 ) , , | 1 Pr( lim m H X z T j ij j j F − = =
→ ν
. 
The intuition is that if every immigrant is truly illegal, then the observed rate of legal immigrants 
is nothing but the misreporting rate  0 m .  Therefore, the identification of  0 m   comes from the 
group of people who are very unlikely to be legal.  Likewise, the identification of  1 m   comes 
from the group of people who are very likely to be legal. 
 
5.  Results 
 
The number of Latina immigrant women who entered the U.S. between 1977 and 1986 at the 
age of at least 14 in LAFANS is 192.  The 192 women have 312 children who were surveyed.  
Out of the 312 children, 44 (14%) have an illegal immigrant  mother.  All  children  took  math  and 
vocabulary test.  Only children at least six years old (279 out of 312) took reading test.  The 
312 children include 120 pairs of siblings and 72 single children.  The unobservable   22
determinants to the scholastic performances between siblings may be correlated.    To account for 
this concern, the standard errors of the following OLS and IV estimations are clustered by 
household, and robust standard errors are used in the two-stage semi-parametric estimations.  
The robust variance matrix estimator
15  does not impose any restrictive structure and fully allows 
for arbitrary serial correlation and heterogeneity (Wooldridge 2002 p.153, p.407 and p.496).    In 
Appendix D, I provide a robustness test of the baseline two-step estimation by collapsing the 
sample by household and estimating the effect of mothers’ legal status on the average test scores 
of siblings.     
 
5.1 The OLS Estimation 
Table IV presents the OLS results.  Four outcomes of children’s scholastic achievements 
are examined: math test score (columns (1)-(2)), reading test score (columns (3)-(4)), vocabulary 
test score (columns (5)-(6)), and the probability of taking tests in English (columns (7)-(8)).  
Mothers’ immigration status strongly correlates with children’s math scores, reading scores and 
probability of taking tests in English, even after the characteristics of both mothers and children 
are controlled.  The difference in math scores and reading scores between the children of legal 
immigrant women and the children of illegal immigrant women are both around 0.5 of a standard 
deviation.  And children of legal immigrants are more likely than their counterparts to take 
English tests by 14 percentage points.  Nonetheless, no association between mothers’ 
immigration status and children’s vocabulary scores is found in columns (5)-(6).    This result is 
consistent with what was shown by Table I.  However, the OLS estimation of mothers’ legal 
status effect is likely subject to both the omitted variables bias and the misreporting bias. 
                                                        
15  The robust variance estimator of the first stage uses the formula (13.53) in Wooldridge (2002), p.407; the robust variance 
estimator of the second stage uses the formula (24) in Murphy and Topel (1985), p.376.   23
 
5.2 The Two-Step Semi-Parametric Estimation 
Table V presents the first stage results of the semi-parametric estimation.
16  Four  estimation 
models are used.    Column (1) only controls for mother’s duration in the U.S.    Column (2) adds 
two pre-migration characteristics of mother: age and years of schooling.    Column (3) controls for 
all observed mother’s characteristics.    Column (4) allows non-linearity in duration effect.    The 
results in columns (1)-(4) show that entering the U.S. before 1982 raises the likelihood of having 
legal status by 61-68 percentage points.  The estimated effect of pre-1982 entry on the 
probability of having legal status is consistent across models, which provides evidence that the 
instrument is exogenous.  As a comparison to the first-stage semi-parametric method, the 
first-stage conventional IV
17 estimates of the four models are also presented in Table V.  The 
first-stage conventional IV estimates are about half of the corresponding semi-parametric 
estimates, which indicates that the conventional IV estimation underestimates the correlation 
between the treatment status and the instrument because of the misreporting error.   
The misreporting rate  0 m  is estimated to be around 0.5, meaning that approximately 50 
percent of truly illegal immigrants misrepresent themselves as legal immigrants.    This magnitude 
of misreporting is not surprising, compared to Warren and Passel’s findings from Census 1980.  
On the other hand,  1 m   is consistently estimated to be zero across models, which means no truly 
legal immigrants misreport themselves to be illegal.  This is consistent with expectations.  To 
evaluate how well the two misreporting rates are estimated, I report the minimum and maximum 
of estimated  ) , , | 1 ˆ Pr(
*
j ij j j H X z T = to see whether they are close to 0 and 1.  All the estimated 
                                                        
16  Only the regressions using the sample of all 312 children are shown.    The regressions using the sample of 279 
children who have reading test scores were not shown here.    But the results are very similar. 
17  See Appendix C for detailed procedures of the conventional IV estimation.   24
maximum probabilities are exactly one and all the estimated minimum probabilities are very close 
to zero, which means the estimates of the two misreporting rates are quite precise. 
Table VI presents the estimation of the second stage of the semi-parametric method.  The 
outcome is children’s math scores.  The controls in columns (1)-(4) are the same as those in 
Table V.  The two-stage semi-parametric estimates indicate that if an illegal immigrant mother 
were legalized, her children’s math scores should increase by approximately 0.70-0.78 of a 
standard deviation.  To compare with the above results, OLS estimates and the second-stage 
conventional IV estimates are also presented.  Notice that the second stage semi-parametric 
estimates are robust across models.  In contrast, the OLS estimates, which drop from 0.75 in 
column (1) to 0.51 in columns (3)-(4), are more sensitive to control variables.    This implies that 
the semi-parametric estimates are not the result of spurious relations.  The semi-parametric 
estimates are all larger than the corresponding OLS estimates, suggesting that the misreporting 
bias dominates the potential omitted variables bias in the OLS estimations.    This is very likely to 
happen considering that half of the illegal immigrants misreport their status.  Moreover, the 
semi-parametric estimates are all smaller than the corresponding IV estimates, which confirms 
that the conventional IV estimates are upwardly biased by misreporting error. 
Table VII presents the second stage semi-parametric results for other children’s scholastic 
achievement outcomes.    Odd numbered columns controls for mother’s duration in the U.S. in a 
linear form.  Even numbered columns allow a quadratic duration impact.  Columns (1)-(2) 
indicate that mothers’ legal status increases children’s reading scores by 0.46-0.50 of a standard 
deviation.    Columns (5)-(6) indicate that mothers’ legal status increases children’s probability of 
taking tests in English by 22 percentage points.  Since illegal immigrants’ children are more 
likely to take test in Spanish, the legal status effect on reading scores perhaps is understated.    If   25
tests were only given in English, illegal immigrants’ children, on average, would have lagged 
behind legal immigrants children by a larger gap.   
Columns (3)-(4) show that mothers’ legal status does not appear to affect children’s 
vocabulary test scores.
18  This could be due to the specialty of the vocabulary test.  This test 
assesses basic reading skills by having participants match a picture and a word, and read aloud as 
many letters and real words as possible in five seconds (as cited in Troia, 2004).    In contrast, the 
reading test, along with the math test, assesses more advanced analytical skills that children have 
to learn and develop under instruction at school.    It could be true that the disadvantages arising 
from parents’ illegal immigration status do not hinder children’s development in their basic skill 
but rather their advanced skills.  This implies that illegal immigration status could affect the 
chances that illegal immigrants’ children grow up to high-skilled adult workers and climb the 
social ladder.     
 
6.  Mechanism 
 
Empirical results in Section 5 demonstrate the positive impact of immigrant women’s legal 
status on their children’s scholastic  achievements.  I  now  proceed to investigate the question of 
why parents’ immigration status plays a role in determining children’s scholastic outcome.  I 
proposed in Section 2 that legal status affects a set of parental choices (e.g. parental income, 
neighborhood choice and parent-school contact), which ultimately affect children’s scholastic 
performance.  In this section, I empirically test the hypothesis that Latina immigrant women’s 
                                                        
18  The mothers’ legal status effect on children’s vocabulary scores may also be understated for the reason that some children 
take the test in Spanish.    I estimated the effect of legal status using the sample only including children who take the test in 
English, the effect is still insignificant, though the magnitude dramatically increases to around 0.4 of a standard deviation.     26
legal status influences these three parental choices.  The  same  two-step  semi-parametric  method 
is used in this section
19, except that the dependent variable becomes the value of household 
earnings, an indicator that whether an immigrant families lives in an ethnic enclave, and an 
indicator that whether an immigrant parent attend her child’s school event.  The results are 
presented in Table VIII.  Odd numbered columns present OLS estimations and even numbered 
columns present the two-stage semi-parametric estimations.   
  Column (2) in Table VIII shows that the legal status of female immigrants
20 increases 
household earnings by 23%, which is consistent to findings in Rivera-Batiz (1999) and Kossoudji 
and Cobb-Clark (2002).    The average household earnings in the sample is $20,000.    Therefore, 
a 23% increase is $4,600.    According to Dahl and Lochner’s (2005) estimation, $1,000 increase 
in income raises Black or Hispanic children’s cognitive test scores by roughly 4 percent of a 
standard deviation.  If the same magnitude of income effect applies to LAFANS sample, the 
$4,600 increase in household earnings can induce an increase in children’s test scores by 18.4 
percent of a standard deviation.  Remember that the total effect of parental legal status on 
children’s test scores is estimated to be 50-70 percent of a standard deviation.  Therefore, the 
channel of household earning accounts for one fourth to one third of the total effect.     
    In columns (3) and (4) of Table VIII, I test whether legal status affects the residential 
location choice of immigrant households.    The outcome is whether a household lives in an ethnic 
enclave, which is defined in this paper as a very poor and predominantly Latino neighborhood.
21  
Though the OLS estimate shows no correlation between women’s legal status and households’ 
                                                        
19  The unit of observation is the household, not children.    Hence, the sample size for the following estimations is 192 at most.   
Due to missing data of various household characteristics, the sample size could be even smaller. 
20 Appendix A shows that the legal status of the mother represents the legal status of both parents in the majority of sampled 
immigrant households.   
21  According to the LAFANS design, the very poor neighborhoods correspond to the tracts that are in the top 10 percent of the 
poverty distribution.  The predominately Latino neighborhoods correspond to the tracts where the percentage of the Latino 
population in the total population is 70 and above.  The neighborhoods satisfying both requirements are defined as ethnic 
enclaves.   27
residence choice, the two-stage semi-parametric estimate indicates that legal status decreases the 
probability of living in enclaves by 17.5 percentage points.         
Lastly, I test whether illegal status prevents immigrant parents from having active contacts 
with children’s school.  The dependent variable is a binary variable which is one if a parent 
attended school events that her child was in.    For households with two sampled children, I find 
that parents are more likely to attend the younger child’s events than the older child’s events.  
Hence, I drop the older children.  The sample for this regression consists of children from 
single-child families and the younger children from multi-child families.  Column (6) indicates 
that legal status improves the likelihood of immigrant parents to attend their children’s school 
events  by  42  percentage  points.       
     
7.  Conclusion 
 
About five million children in the U.S. live in families in which at least one parent is an 
unauthorized immigrant.    This paper addresses the intergenerational impact of immigrants’ legal 
status on their children’s scholastic achievements.  The empirical analysis exploits the 
exogenous variation in legal status as the result of IRCA, the largest amnesty program in the U.S. 
history, and uses a two-step semi-parametric method to purge the misclassification bias caused by 
misreporting in legal status by illegal immigrants.    The empirical estimation indicates that: had 
the Latina illegal immigrant women who arrived in the U.S. between 1982-86 migrated before 
1982 and been granted legal status by IRCA, their children on average would have improved their 
math scores by 0.7 of a standard deviation and the reading scores by 0.5 of a standard deviation.   
Immigrants’ legal status is also found to increase children’s probability of taking tests in English   28
rather than Spanish by 22 percentage points.     
This paper also investigates the mechanisms through which immigrant parents’ legal status 
affects children’s scholastic performance.  Empirical analyses using the same two-step 
semi-parametric method find that the exogenous change in immigrant women’s immigration 
status from illegal to legal increases household earnings, reduces the probability of living in 
ethnic enclaves and increases parents’ involvement in children’s school events.     
Considering that the population of the unauthorized Latino immigrants and their families has 
continued to grow in the past two decades, the negative intergenerational educational consequence 
of illegal status may contribute to the existing ethnic inequality in children’s scholastic 
performance in the U.S..    The beneficiaries of IRCA had the opportunity to raise their children in 
more affluent and stable families and to provide more support to their children’s education than if 
they had remained unauthorized.    Hence, the children of these beneficiaries will be more likely 
to move upward in social class when they reach adulthood.  The findings in this paper, which 
though was derived from a relatively small sample and needs future studies using other dataset to 
confirm, suggest the importance of taking into account the intergenerational impact of legal status 
when one intends to evaluate the consequences of a historic amnesty program or predict the 
possible consequences of new immigration legislations.     29
Appendix 
 
A. Immigration Status of the Father and the Mother 
Due to the design of LAFANS survey, only 25% of households provided father’s information.   
In each household, a randomly selected adult (RSA) was interviewed.  On the other hand, the 
mother (Primary Care Giver) of the children in the household was also interviewed.    If the PCG 
coincidently was the RSA as well, the household only had one adult surveyed.  Otherwise, the 
household had two adults surveyed.     
Lack of fathers’ information does not prevent us from estimating the effect of parental 
immigration status.  I examine the 485 LAFANS families in which both the husband’s and the 
wife’s immigration status are available and find that women’s self-reported immigration status is 
highly correlated with their husbands’ self-reported immigration status.    Table A.2 presents the 
matrix of husband-wife immigration status, where the diagonal elements dominate.  168 out of 
205 (82%) legal immigrant women’s husbands are also legal immigrants; 75 out of 100 (75%) 
illegal immigrant women’s husbands are also illegal immigrants.    Hence, women’s self-reported 
status, in the majority of the cases, represents the reported status of both parents.    The reason of 
the high correlation between husbands’ and wives’ status could be the matching mechanism in 
marriage, and also could be that the immigration policy in the U.S. favors family reunion, which 
makes it easy for one person to obtain legal status if her/his spouse is a legal immigrant.     
If two parents’ status perfectly matched, the estimated effect of women’s legal status would 
actually capture the effects from both parents.  However, notice that about one in four illegal 
women’s husbands is a legal immigrant.  Kanaiaupuni (2000) finds that the immigrant family 
with mixed legal status is slightly better-off than the family with two illegal parents in social and   30
economic status.  His finding implies that, in a two-parent household, one illegal immigrant 
parent could be less harmful than two illegal immigrant parents.  Therefore, the effect of 
women’s legal status estimated from this survey should be understood as the lower bound of the 
effect of both parents’ legal status and the upper bound of the effect of mother’s legal status only. 
 
C. Procedure of the IV Estimation 
In Section 4, the empirical model of the IV estimation is represented by equations (5a) and (5b): 
( 5 a )          ij i ij i ij H X T y ε α α β α + + + ⋅ + = 2 1 0 ; 
( 5 b )          ) 0 ( 1 2 1 0 > + + + + = ij i ij i i H X z T ν θ θ λ θ . 
Since the endogenous variable is a binary indicator of treatment, I use the procedure proposed by 
Woodridge (2001, p.623) 
(a’) Estimate the legal status  i T by a regular Logit or Probit model 
) ; , , ( ) , , | 1 Pr( λ ν i ij i i ij i i H X z F H X z T = = .  Obtain the fitted probability  ij F   ˆ
υ .  This step is the 
same as the first step of the semi-parametric method, except that the misreporting rates are assumed 
absent. 
(b’)    Estimate the equation of (5a) by IV using instruments 1,  ij F   ˆ
υ ,  ij X , and  i H .   
The second step (b’) here is different from the second step (b) of the semi-parametric estimation, 
which is to run an OLS regression with  ij F   ˆ
υ  replacing  i T  and then to derive the standard errors.  
The reasons for applying different second steps in different estimations are as follows: First, using (b’) 
instead of (b) in the IV estimation has several nice features (Woodridge 2002, p.623).  The standard 
errors are asymptotically valid and do not have to be adjusted.  Also this approach exploits the binary 
nature of the endogenous explanatory variable, and thus is asymptotically efficient.  However, the 
semi-parametric method cannot use this approach as the second step, because the  i T   is measured with   31
error.  Using  ij F   ˆ
υ   as the instrument is no better than using  i z   as the instrument.  The 
misclassification bias of the conventional IV estimation is the same for any instrument satisfying the 
usual IV assumption (Kane et al. 1999). 
 
D. A Robustness Test   
The robustness of the previous results is examined by estimating the effect of the mother’s 
legal status on average scores of children by household.  The original 312-child sample was 
collapsed to household level; the new sample size drops to 192 for math scores and 170 for 
reading scores.  Table A.3 presents the results, which are generally similar to the results in 
Tables VI-VII.    The effect of the mothers’ legal status on children’s math and reading scores is, 
respectively, 0.76 and 0.45 of a standard deviation.  Both estimates are very close to the 
estimates using the individual children sample.    The second stage semi-parametric estimates are 
also found to be much lower than the conventional IV estimates, while in the first stage the 
marginal effect of entering before 1982 estimated by semi-parametric method is much higher than 
the IV estimates.  These evidences, again, indicates the existence of misreporting.  The 
estimated misreporting rates are around 0.45 for truly illegal immigrants and 0 for truly legal 
immigrants, both of which confirm the previous estimates. 
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Table I.    Comparison between Legal and Illegal Latina Immigrant Women   
and Their Children 
 
   Illegal Legal  Difference 
(1) (2)  (3)=(1)-(2) 
Child 
Math -0.302  -0.155  -0.146* 
[0.069] [0.056] [-0.089] 
Reading -0.549  -0.379  -0.170* 
[0.086] [0.058] [0.104] 
Vocabulary -0.017  0.058  -0.075 
[0.100] [0.060] [0.117] 
Test in English  0.53  0.787  -0.257*** 
[0.032] [0.019] [0.037] 
Observations 439  735 
 
Mother     
Years of Schooling  8.163  9.17  -1.007*** 
[0.296] [0.251] [0.388] 
Age 32.977  39.112  -6.135*** 
[0.499] [0.529] [0.727] 
Duration in The U.S.  10.616  20.02  -9.404*** 
[0.434] [0.487] [0.652] 
Age at Entry  21.883  18.532  3.351*** 
[0.571] [0.521] [0.773] 
1.5 Generation  0.081  0.235  -0.154*** 
(=1 if arrived before age 14)  [0.023]  [0.026]  [0.034] 
Speaking Spanish at Home  0.938  0.749  0.189*** 
[0.024] [0.026] [0.036] 
Living with Spouse  0.651  0.672  -0.02 
[0.0338] [0.027]  [0.047] 
Number of Children  2.844  3.134  -0.290* 
[0.143] [0.090] [0.169] 
Employed 0.402  0.609  -0.207*** 
[0.040] [0.029] [0.049] 
Family Earnings  18.247  31.027  -12.780*** 
[1.014] [1.708] [1.988] 
Living in an Ethnic Enclave  0.278  0.147  0.131*** 
[0.027] [0.011] [0.033] 
Attended Children’s  0.552  0.652  -0.100** 
School Events  [0.036]  [0.024]  [0.043] 
Observations  291 480    
Notes:  
1. The means are weighted by the LAFANS sampling weights for PCGs or children.   37
2. Standard errors are in brackets.    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   38
Table II.    The Year 1982 Is the Cut-off 
 
Dependent Variable: Legal Status 
  Linear Probability  Probit (Marginal Effect) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Entered_77 0.424**  0.503*     
 [0.19]  [0.30]     
Entered_78 0.424**  0.484*     
 [0.19]  [0.27]     
Entered_79 0.408**  0.427*  0.166***  0.123*** 
 [0.19]  [0.24]  [0.04]  [0.05] 
Entered_80 0.424**  0.439**     
 [0.19]  [0.21]     
Entered_81 0.416**  0.365*  0.226***  0.153*** 
 [0.19]  [0.19]  [0.06]  [0.05] 
Entered_83 0.260    0.180    0.095  0.025 
 [0.24]  [0.25]  [0.06]  [0.08] 
Entered_84 -0.105  -0.182  -0.054  -0.278 
 [0.25]  [0.24]  [0.14]  [0.29] 
Entered_85 0.165  0.053  0.07  -0.095 
 [0.21]  [0.25]  [0.07]  [0.22] 
Entered_86 0.283  0.136  0.108**  -0.11 
 [0.21]  [0.27]  [0.05]  [0.32] 
Duration in the U.S.    -0.031    -0.041 
   [0.05]    [0.04] 
Other Controls  N  Y  N  Y 
Observations 192  192  140  140 
R
2 / psedo-R
2  0.25 0.29  0.23 0.32 
Notes: 
1. Other control variables include age, years of schooling, an indicator that 
whether speaks Spanish at home, an indicator that whether lives with spouse, 
and the number of children. 
2. Regressions are weighted by the LAFANS sampling weights for PCGs. 
3. Columns 1 and 2 use the Linear Probability model, because the linear 
regression can be run with the full sample.  Columns 3 and 4 use the 
Probit regressions, which automatically drop observations who entered 
in 1977, 1978, and 1980 because immigrants who entered in those three 
years are all legal immigrants. 
4. Robust standard errors are in brackets.    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   39
  Table III.    Comparison between Pre-1982 and Post-1982 Immigrants and Children 
 
   All  1977-81    1982-86  Difference 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)=(2)-(3) 
Mother        
Legal 0.873  0.995  0.716  0.279*** 
 [0.031]  [0.003]  [0.063]  [0.063] 
Years of Schooling  8.073  7.967  8.210  -0.243 
 [0.348]  [0.491]  [0.488]  [0.693] 
Age 40.373  42.515  37.614  4.901*** 
 [0.607]  [0.853]  [0.738]  [1.129] 
Duration in the U.S.  18.926  21.064  16.171  4.893*** 
 [0.246]  [0.173]  [0.171]  [0.240] 
Age at Entry  21.029  20.953  21.126  -0.172 
 [0.589]  [0.855]  [0.781]  [1.160] 
Speaking Spanish at home  0.845  0.805  0.898  -0.093 
 [0.033]  [0.051]  [0.035]  [0.062] 
Living with Spouse  0.712  0.729  0.690  0.039 
 [0.040]  [0.053]  [0.060]  [0.081] 
Number of Children  3.188  3.181  3.196  0.015 
 [0.137]  [0.229]  [0.161]  [0.277] 
Observations 192  99  93   
        
Child               
Math Test Score  -0.136  -0.045  -0.242  0.197 
 [0.091]  [0.139]  [0.105]  [0.174] 
Reading Test Score  -0.495  -0.375  -0.645  0.269 
 [0.100]  [0.147]  [0.111]  [0.185] 
Vocabulary Test Score  0.017  0.078  -0.054  0.132 
 [0.099]  [0.145]  [0.132]  [0.196] 
Tests in English  0.789  0.860  0.707  0.153** 
 [0.038]  [0.040]  [0.065]  [0.077] 
Female 0.482  0.452  0.517  -0.064 
 [0.037]  [0.050]  [0.053]  [0.073] 
Age 11.156  11.466  10.797  0.669 
 [0.321]  [0.435]  [0.491]  [0.657] 
Observations  312  162 150     
Notes: 
1. The means are weighted by the LAFANS sampling weights for PCGs or children. 
2. Standard errors are in brackets.     
3. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table  IV.  The  OLS  Estimations 
 
D e p e n d e n t   V a r i a b l e :                        T e s t   S c o r e s   Take Test 
 Math  Reading  Vocabulary in  English 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5)  (6) (7)  (8) 
Mother  Has    0.656*** 0.513*** 0.658*** 0.463**  0.194 0.141  0.289**  0.140* 
Legal  Status  [0.19] [0.17] [0.22] [0.21] [0.30] [0.34]  [0.141]  [0.079] 
Mother’s     -0.030   0.013    0.013    0.006 
Duration in US    [0.04]    [0.04]    [0.04]    [0.011] 
Other  Controls  N Y  N  Y N  Y  N  Y 
Observations 312 312 279 279 312  312  312  312 
R
2 / pseudo R
2  0.05 0.25 0.04 0.19  0.00  0.15  0.05  0.32 
Notes: 
1. Other control variables include Mother’s age, years of schooling, an indicator that whether mother 
speaks Spanish at home, an indicator that whether both parents are present, the number of children in 
the household, and children’s age dummies. 
2. Regressions are weighted by the LAFANS sampling weights for children. 
3. Robust standard errors are in brackets.    Standard Errors are clustered by household. 
4. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   41
Table V.    The Effect of Pre-1982 Entry on Legal Status 
 
Dependent Variable: Mother’s Legal Status 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Marginal Effect of  0.659**  0.676**  0.614*  0.670** 
Entering before 1982  [0.277]  [0.282]  [0.351]  [0.331] 
m0   0.420  0.504*** 0.511***  0.524*** 
 [0.333]  [0.205]  [0.111]  [0.118] 
m1   0.006  0.007*  0.004  0.004 
 [0.004]  [0.004]  [0.003]  [0.003] 
Min(Pr(legal) )  5.4*10
-47 2.2*10
-4 7.3*10
-5 5.3*10
-4 
Max(Pr(legal)) 1  1  1  1 
Reference (1
st stage of IV)       
Marginal Effect of  0.395***  0.305*** 0.277***  0.253** 
Entering before 1982  [0.140]  [0.111]  [0.099]  [0.098] 
        
Other Covariates (coefficients, not marginal effects) 
Mother’s Duration in US  -0.386  -0.493  -0.510    0.237 
 [0.332]  [0.360]  [0.488]  [3.443] 
Duration Squared        -0.019 
       [0.109] 
Characteristics at Entry  N  Y  Y  Y 
        
Other Controls  N  N  Y  Y 
Observations 312  312  312  312 
Notes: 
1. Column (1) only controls for duration in the U.S..  Column (2) adds two 
pre-determined characteristics: age at entry and years of schooling, as the additional 
controls.  Column (3) adds more controls including an indicator that whether 
mother speaks Spanish at home, an indicator that whether the child live with both 
parents, an indicator that whether the child is the only child, child’s gender, and 
child’s age dummies.    Column (4) adds the control variable of duration squared. 
2. Marginal effects are calculated as  ) , , 0 | 1 Pr( ) , , 1 | 1 Pr(
* * H X z T H X z T = = − = = , 
where  H X,  are  sample  means. 
3.  0 m   is the misreporting rate of truly illegal immigrants and  1 m  is  misreporting  rate 
of truly legal immigrants. 
4. Regressions are weighted by the LAFANS sampling weights for children. 
5. Robust standard errors are in brackets.     
6. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.           42
 
      Table VI.    The Effect of Mothers’ Legal Status on Children’s Math Scores 
 
Dependent Variable: Child’s Math Score 
    (1)    (2)    (3)    (4) 
Mother Has Legal Status  0.764*  0.766**  0.700**  0.778*** 
(2-stage  semi-parametric)  [0.393] [0.320] [0.282] [0.302] 
Reference      
OLS  0.753*** 0.576*** 0.513*** 0.511*** 
  [0.189] [0.171] [0.190] [0.167] 
IV  1.205*** 1.150*** 0.954**  0.942*** 
  [0.454] [0.370] [0.374] [0.364] 
      
Other Covariates      
Mother’s  Duration  in  U.S.  -0.056 -0.054 -0.057 -0.296 
  [0.034] [0.035] [0.036] [0.365] 
Duration  Squared     0.006 
     [0.009] 
Characteristics  at  Entry  N Y Y Y 
Other  Controls  N N Y Y 
R
2  0.10   0.20   0.25  0.25   
Observations  312 312 312 312 
Notes: 
1. Column (1) only controls for duration in the U.S..  Column (2) adds two 
pre-determined characteristics: age at entry and years of schooling, as the 
additional controls.    Column (3) adds more controls including an indicator that 
whether mother speaks Spanish at home, an indicator that whether the child live 
with both parents, an indicator that whether the child is the only child, child’s 
gender, and child’s age dummies.  Column (4) adds the control variable of 
duration squared. 
2. Regressions are weighted by the LAFANS sampling weights for children. 
3. Robust standard errors are in brackets.     
4. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
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Table VII.    The Effect of Mothers’ Legal Status on Children’s Other Scholastic Achievements 
 
Dependent Variable  Reading Score  Vocabulary Score  Take Test in English 
    (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)    (6) 
Mother Has Legal Status  0.507*  0.459*  0.122  0.054  0.229**  0.215* 
(2-stage  semi-parametric)  [0.287] [0.281] [0.346]  [0.311]  [0.112] [0.115] 
Reference          
OLS  0.463** 0.461** 0.141  0.152  0.140*  0.151* 
 [0.214]  [0.214]  [0.335]  [0.333] [0.082]  [0.080] 
IV  0.911** 0.895** 0.127  0.126  0.555  0.575 
 [0.449]  [0.443]  [0.656]  [0.657] [0.588]  [0.879] 
          
Other Covariates         
Mother’s Duration in U.S.  0.004  -0.113  0.010  0.556  0.001  0.129 
 [0.036]  [0.318]  [0.036]  [0.373] [0.011]  [0.127] 
Duration Squared    0.003    -0.014    -0.003 
   [0.008]    [0.010]    [0.003] 
Characteristics  at  Entry  Y Y Y  Y  Y Y 
Other  Controls  Y Y Y  Y  Y Y 
R
2  0.18 0.18 0.15  0.16  0.28 0.28 
Observations  279 279 312  312  312 312 
Notes: 
1. Characteristics at Entry include two variables: age at entry and years of schooling.  Other controls 
include an indicator that whether mother speaks Spanish at home, an indicator that whether the child 
live with both parents, an indicator that whether the child is the only child, child’s gender, and child’s 
age dummies. 
2. Regressions are weighted by the LAFANS sampling weights for children. 
3. Robust standard errors are in brackets.     
4. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
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Table VIII.    The Effect of Legal Status on Parental Opportunities and Choices 
 
Dependent 
Variable:  ln(household earnings)  Living in an Enclave  Attend School Events 
OLS 2-stage  OLS  2-stage  OLS  2-stage 
(1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Legal Status  0.459*  0.236*  0.061  -0.175**  0.015 0.421* 
[0.270] [0.121]  [0.087]  [0.085]  [0.141] [0.236] 
1st Stage   
before 1982  0.663***  0.725*  0.570* 
(Marginal Effect)  [0.183]  [0.441]  [0.347] 
m0 0.509  0.453***  0.455** 
[0.724] [0.096]  [0.191] 
m1 0.003  0.042  0.000 
[0.008] [0.026]  [0.000] 
Observations 161  161  192 192  186  186 
Notes: 
1.  Earnings have been adjusted for inflation since the survey is conducted from 2000-2002. 
2.  The other covariates include immigrant women’s years of schoolings, age, a quadratic form 
of duration in the U.S., language preference, living with spouse or not, the single child 
indicator, and the average value of children’s age by household. 
3.  Marginal effect is the sample average of the effects of before 1982 on legal status, i.e. 
) , , 0 | 1 Pr( ) , , 1 | 1 Pr(
* *
i i i i i i i i H X z T H X z T = = − = = . 
4.  0 m  is the misreporting rate of truly illegal immigrants and  1 m  is misreporting rate of 
truly legal immigrants. 
5.  Regressions are weighted by the LAFANS sampling weights for PCGs. 
6.  Robust standard errors are in brackets.    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Figure I.    To Define Immigrants’ Legal Status 
 
 
Source: LAFANS 
 
Q1. Are you a citizen of the U.S.? 
 
Legal  
Q2. Do you currently have a Green Card? 
Q3. Were you granted asylum, etc.? 
Q4. Do you have a visa to stay in the U.S.? 
 
Illegal 
Q5. Is your visa still valid or expired? 
Y 
N 
Y 
Y 
Valid 
N
  Y
N 
Y 
N 
Expired   46
 
Figure II.    The Ratio of Legal Immigrant Women to Total Immigrant Women by Entry Year 
 
   
Source: LAFANS 
Notes:  
1. Only Latina immigrant women who entered the U.S. at age no less than 14 are in use (see 
text for details).    The sample size is 696 Latina immigrant women (legal 389 / illegal 307). 
2. The LAFANS sampling weights for PCGs are used to compute the ratios. 
Birth of IRCA  cut-off   47
 
Figure III.    Children’s Test Scores by Mother’s Entry Year 
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Source: LAFANS 
Notes:   
1.  The numbers in Figures a and b are sample means of math and reading test scores.  
The numbers in Figure c are the ratio of children taking tests in English to total 
number of children.     
2.  The LAFANS sampling weights for children are used to compute the means and the 
ratio. 
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Figure IV.    The Number of Latina Immigrant Women by Entry Year 
 
 
Source: LAFANS 
Note: Only Latina immigrant women who entered the U.S. at age no less than 14 are 
in use. The sample size is 696 Latina immigrant women.   50
Figure V.    Latina Immigrant Women’s Characteristics by Entry Year 
 
 
 
 
Source: LAFANS 
Notes:  
1. Only Latina immigrant women who entered the U.S. at age no less than 14 are in use. The 
sample size is 696 Latina immigrant women (legal 389 / illegal 307). 
2. The LAFANS sampling weights for PCGs are used to compute the ratios.   51
Figure VI.    Immigrant Inflow and Economic Fluctuation in Destination 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: LAFANS, Census 2000, and Bureau of Labor Statistics.   52
Table A.1.    Woodcock-Johnson Test of Achievement Scores 
 
Renormalized 
Standard Score 
Standard Score 
Percentile Rank  WJ-R Classification 
> 2  131 and above  98 - 99.9  Very Superior 
1.334 - 2  121 - 130  92 - 97  Superior 
0.668 - 1.333  111 - 120  76 - 91  High Average 
-0.667 - 0.667  90 - 110  25 - 75  Average 
-1.333 - -0.668  80 - 89  9 - 24  Low Average 
-2 - -1.334  70 - 79  3 - 8  Low 
< -2  69 and below  0.1 - 2  Low Poor 
      Source:  LAFANS  manual  p.90. 
 
 
 
 
Table A. 2. 
The Correlation Between Husbands’ and Wives’ Self-reported Immigration Status 
 
           Husband         
    Native  Legal  Illegal  Total 
   Native  154    24    2   180  
Wife Legal    25    168   12   205  
    Illegal    1    24   75   100  
    Total  180   216   89   485  
Source: LAFANS 
   53
Table A.3.    The Effect of Immigration Status on Average Scores of Siblings by Households 
 
Dependent Variable: Child’s Test Score 
 Math  Score  Reading  Score 
2nd Stage  OLS 2-stage  IV  OLS  2-stage  IV 
Legal 0.610***  0.764***  0.906*** 0.530**  0.452***  1.062*** 
  [0.194] [0.136]  [0.351] [0.227] [0.169] [0.391] 
         
Reference (Results in Table VI (col3) and Table VII (col1)      
Legal 0.513***  0.700*  0.954**  0.463**  0.507*  0.911** 
  [0.190] [0.282]  [0.374] [0.214] [0.287] [0.449] 
         
1st Stage         
before 1982    0.501*  0.197**    0.611**  0.204* 
(Marginal Effect)    [0.270]  [0.097]    [0.263]  [0.106] 
m0   0.438**    0.454**   
   [0.213]    [0.183]   
m1   0.000      0.000   
   [0.000]      [0.000]   
            
Reference (Results in Table V, col3)        
Marginal Effect of    0.614*  0.277***   0.419*  0.253** 
Entering before 1982    [0.351]  [0.099]    [0.248]  [0.120] 
m0   0.511***      0.395***   
   [0.111]      [0.130]   
m1   0.004     0.009*   
   [0.003]      [0.005]   
Observations  192 192  192 182 182 182 
Notes: 
1.  The other covariates include immigrant women’s years of schoolings, age, duration in the 
U.S., language preference, living with spouse or not, the single child indicator, the average 
value of sibling’s gender indicator and the average values of sibling’s age dummies. 
2.  Marginal effects are calculated as  ) , , 0 | 1 Pr( ) , , 1 | 1 Pr(
* * H X z T H X z T = = − = = , 
where  H X,  are  sample  means. 
3.  0 m   is the misreporting rate of truly illegal immigrants and  1 m   is misreporting rate of truly 
legal immigrants. 
4. Regressions are weighted by the average value of LAFANS sampling weights for children by 
households. 
5. Robust standard errors are in brackets.     
6. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
 